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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
However, it should be recognized that this application of the
responsive verdict statute subjects a defendant to the possibility
of two trials for a single homicide, and it may be argued that the
second posecution is contrary to the real spirit of the constitu-
tional guarantee against double jeopardy. Had there been a con-
viction of manslaughter, surely the defendant could not have been
subsequently tried for negligent homicide. Thus it is apparent
that two distinct offenses have not been committed in the same
act-either there has been a manslaughter or a negligent homi-
cide. In the early Louisiana case of State v. Cheevers,2 5 it was
stated that "no man shall be punished twice for the same criminal
act." If this test is to determine the scope of the constitutional
prohibition against double jeopardy, then it logically follows that
this right should not be restricted by the new statutory responsive
verdict limitations. This approach, however, is somewhat weak-
ened by the court's holding in the recent case of State v. Mitchell.26
In that case the defendant was convicted of simple assault, and
subsequently tried and convicted of cruelty to juveniles, both
convictions being predicated upon the same attack upon a sixteen
year old boy. The Mitchell case was not argued on appeal and
may not be entitled to any great weight,27 but it at least casts a
doubt upon the rule stated in the Cheevers decision that there shall
be only one trial for a single criminal act.
Winfred G. Boriack
LABOR LAW-STATE COMPULSORY ARBITRATION ACT INVALID FOR
CONFLICT WITH NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
Transit workers were fined for disobeying an anti-strike
restraining order obtained by the Wisconsin Employment Rela-
tions Board, under the Wisconsin Public Utility Anti-Strike Law.'
This law substitutes for collective bargaining, compulsory arbi-
tration upon order of the Wisconsin board whenever an impasse
is reached in disputes between employees and management of
public utilities. It prohibits strikes in public utilities and makes
disobedience of restraining orders punishable by fine. Held, the
Wisconsin act conflicts with Section 7 of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act of 1935 as amended by the Labor Management Act of
25. 7 La. Ann. 40, 41 (1852).
26. 210 La. 1078, 29 So. 2d 162 (1946).
27. The Mitchell case was discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Su-
preme Court for the 1946-1947 Term-Criminal Procedure, 8 LOUISIANA LA.W
RE vEw 290 (1948).
1. Wis. Stat. (1947) § 111.50 et seq.
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1947. Motor Coach Employees v. Wisconsin Board, 71 S. Ct. 359
(U.S. 1951).
The states in regulating labor relations attempt to relieve the
public of inconveniences caused by labor disputes, such as depri-
vation of essential utility services. On the other hand, the federal
government has undertaken to encourage collective bargaining
at the risk of public inconvenience, except in national emergen-
cies. Because Congress did not designate the bounds of federal
and state jurisdictions in the federal act, the Supreme Court must
determine in each case whether the application of state law con-
flicts with federal policy.
The cases involving the problem of such conflict fall into two
main categories exemplified by Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Board2 and Hill v. Florida.8
In Allen-Bradley v. Wisconsin Board the Supreme Court held
that because mass picketing, threats, interference at plant en-
trances and with use of streets, were not made subject to regula-
tion by the national board, nor included among rights conferred
and protected by the federal act, the state had power to compel
employees to desist from such activities.4 The decision was based
on the belief that such conduct was not essential to realization of
federal guaranties to labor. Regulations which in effect required
only that a strike be peaceful did nothing to hinder collective
bargaining. The state's jurisdiction there was clear, and the deci-
sion was unanimous. But the Court pointed out that "If the order
of the state Board affected the status of the employees, or if it
caused a forfeiture of collective bargaining rights, a distinctly
different question would arise."5
That question arose in Hill v. Florida. A Florida statute6
required union business agents to obtain a license from a state
board which had power to deny the license on grounds that the
applicant had not been a citizen of the United States for more
than ten years, or had been convicted of a felony, or was not of
good moral character. The statute also required unions to file an
annual report with the state. For their failure to comply with
these requirements, a union and its business agent were enjoined
from functioning as such. The Court found that the licensing
2. 815 U.S. 740 (1942).
3. 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
4. Wis. Employment Peace Act, Laws 1939, c. 57, Wis. Stat. (1939) c. 111,
p. 1610 et seq.
5. 315 U.S. 740, 751 (1942).
6. Fla. Stat. Ann. (1950) §§ 447.04, 447.06.
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requirement conflicted with the Wagner Act, which guaranteed
employees "full freedom ' 7 in selecting their representatives.
Though the requirement of an annual union report was not incon-
sistent with the Wagner Act, the sanction imposed conflicted with
"the federally protected process of collective bargaining." Hence
both sections of the statute were invalidated.
Although the Wagner Act was enacted to give labor guaran-
tees against employer interference with collective bargaining
rights, this decision made those guarantees good against the state
also.
In Bethlehem Steel Company v. New York State Labor Rela-
tions Board9 the state board was held without jurisdiction to
direct recognition of foremen as a bargaining unit, although it
had done so only after the National Labor Relations Board had
refused to do so. The Court rejected the contention that the
state board could act until the federal board had exercised juris-
diction. The precise question of state action in absence of federal
action was not at issue, because the Court held that the federal
board's refusal to certify the foremen was an exercise of the
board's jurisdiction.'0
The holding of the Bethlehem case was followed in La Crosse
Telephone Corporation v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Board" where certification of a union by the state board was
invalidated. The Court found conflict in that the Wisconsin act1 2
allowed a majority of the employees in a single craft, division,
department or plant to elect to constitute themselves a separate
bargaining unit;. whereas the federal act 3 left that matter to the
discretion of the national board. The national board had not
exercised its jurisdiction over the specific situation, as it had in
the Bethlehem case; the union had withdrawn its petition from
the national board and submitted it to the state board, before the
former had acted upon the petition. Referring to the Bethlehem
case the Court said, "Both the state and the federal statutes had
laid hold of the same relationship and had provided different
standards for its regulation. Since the employees in question
were subject to regulation by the National Board, we thought
7. 49 Stat. 449, 450, § 1 (i935), 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1946).
8. 325 U.S; 538, 543 (1945).
9. 330 U.S. 767 (1947).
10. Id. at 775. "we cannot, therefore, deal with this as a case where
federal power has been delegated but lies dormant and unexercised."
11. 336 U.S. 18 (1949).
12. Wis. Stat. (1947) c. 111.
13. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1946).
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the situation too fraught with potential conflict to permit the
intrusion of the state agency." The Court then added, "Those
considerations control the present cases." And, "The uncertainty
as to which board is master and how long it will remain such can
be as disruptive of peace between various industrial factions as
actual competition between two boards for supremacy."'1 4 In
short, so long as the national board has jurisdiction over the
industry, state boards may not certify unions and bargaining units
even when the national board has not acted, because the Court
will not allow states to create situations in which potential con-
flicts between boards might impede collective bargaining.
In International Union of United Automobile Workers v.
O'Brien,1 5 in which the Supreme Court declared that Congress has
occupied exclusively the field of regulating peaceful strikes for
higher wages, the Court invalidated the strike vote provision in a
Michigan law,'16 on the grounds that it required majority authori-
zation by employees before strikes could be called, and it imposed
a different waiting period than did the federal law. The cases dis-
cussed above 7 are cited evidently as instances in which Congress
has occupied a field of labor regulation, implying that for that
reason state regulation was prohibited. Yet those cases were de-
cided upon conflict found in application of state and federal laws
to specific situations, the conflict in the La Crosse decision actually
being only a potential one. 5 That case does seem to invalidate the
state law on the grounds that Congress occupied the field. But
the O'Brien case did not need the authority of such precedents. It
involved conflict between state and federal law as applied to the
particular facts. Thus the statement of the Court about Congress
occupying the field of regulating peaceful strikes seems to be
broad superfluous language. Yet it was perhaps persuasive in the
Court's handling of Motor Coach Employees v. Wisconsin Board9
where that language is approvingly quoted.
14. 336 U.S. 18, 25 (1949).
15. 339 U.S. 454 (1950).
16. Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) § 423.1 et seq.
17. Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York
Board, 330 U.S. 767 (1947); La Crosse Telephone Corp. v. Wisconsin Board,
336 U.S. 18 (1949).
18. In the Bethlehem case the national board refused to designate fore-
men as a bargaining unit, which refusal was held by the Supreme Court to be
an exercise of the board's jurisdiction. In the La Crosse case the union's
petition was withdrawn before the national board had acted upon it. Thus
in both cases the national board had received a petition upon which it had
power to exercise its jurisdiction but it exercised its jurisdiction only in the
Bethlehem case.
19. 71 S. Ct. 359 (U.S. 1951).
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As the La Crosse case set the policy of denying state certifica-
tion of unions and bargaining units where the national board had
jurisdiction over an industry, the O'Brien case hinted that a sim-
ilar policy may be followed in regulation of peaceful strikes.
The cases discussed are those in which state laws were invali-
dated because they were found to conflict with federal labor pol-
icy. In the other category, set by Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin
Board, two cases are to be considered.
Algoma Plywood & Veneer Company v. Wisconsin Employ-
ment Relations Board20 upheld a Wisconsin law,2 1 requiring two-
thirds approval by union members, of maintenance of membership
clauses in union-employer contracts. The Court pointed out that
the exclusive jurisdiction given the national board in Section
10 (a) of the federal act is limited to those unfair practices listed
in Section 8. Section 8 (3), on the basis of its legislative history,
was held not to affect state legislation on maintenance of member-
ship agreements. Evidently the Court believed that state regula-
tion of union security agreements was not the kind of restriction
that would hamper collective bargaining.22
In International Union, United Automobile Workers v. Wis-
consin Employment Relations Board,28 the Court upheld the state's
power to prohibit unannounced intermittent work stoppages
called for unrevealed purposes. The Court held that the national
board had power to forbid a strike only when its purpose was
illegal and that the state could prohibit illegal strike methods.
Sections 7 and 13 of the National Labor Relations Act did not give
the national board jurisdiction over the concerted activity in-
volved in this case. Such employee conduct was not a mere con-
certed activity, but a "coercive tactic" such as the slowdown on
the sitdown strike.24
Comparing International Union, United Auto, Workers v. Wis-
consin Board with Motor Coach Employees v. Wisconsin Board,
20. 336 U.S. 301 (1949).
21. Wis. Stat. (1947) § 111.06(1)(c)1.
22. In 1947, this decision was codified in Section 14(b) of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act.
23. 336 U.S. 245 (1949).
24. The majority took cognizance of the fact that such "coercive tactics"
made it impossible for the employer to plan his production and to inform his
customers what to expect. Speaking of the majority opinion, Justice Murphy
said, "In effect, it adopts the employer's plea that it cannot plan production
schedules, cannot notify its customers and suppliers, cannot determine its
output with any degree of certainty and that these inconveniences withdraw
this activity from § 7 of the national statutes. The majority and the Wis-
consin court call the weapon objectionable, then, only because it is effective."
Id. at 269.
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we find that Black and Douglas who supported federal jurisdiction
in International Union, United Auto Workers v. Wisconsin Board,
also supported it in Motor Coach Employees v. Wisconsin Board.
And Frankfurter and Burton, who were in the United Auto Work-
ers majority for state jurisdiction, are with the minority for state
jurisdiction in the Motor Coach Employees case. But Vinson, Reed
and Jackson are in the majority in both decisions. Since Minton
and Clark were not on the bench in the United Auto Workers case
(and paired in the Motor Coach case), it was the fact that Vinson,
Reed and Jackson saw a difference between the two cases which
kept the United Auto Workers case from being cast into the cate-
gory of the Hill case. Those three justices require more persuasion
than do the others of the majority in the Motor Coach case, to
convince them that state law conflicts with federal law.
In view of the fact that International Union, United Automo-
bile Workers is a five-to-four decision, and the fact that Vinson,
Reed and Jackson shifted their position and supported federal
jurisdiction in the Motor Coach Employees case, much of the
strength has been drained from the International Union, United
Automobile Workers decision. Further weakening the case's au-
thority is the fact that it preceded the O'Brien case with its dictum
on congressional occupation of the field of peaceful strikes. The
Motor Coach Employees case, on the other hand, is in line with
the O'Brien decision and adds strength to the O'Brien dictum on
exclusive congressional regulation of peaceful strikes. In future
cases involving regulation of peaceful strikes the O'Brien case
and the Motor Coach Employees case will be strong precedents
for urging exclusive federal jurisdiction.
The states are faced with the problem of regulating local
strike emergencies in spite of the Motor Coach Employees deci-
sion. Specifically, they are faced with a choice of alternative poli-
cies. State ownership of public utilities seems unlikely to evolve
on account of opposition from labor and management, and gen-
eral public antipathy to socialization of industries. The states can,
through their police power, seize and operate utilities during
emergencies. The policy of seizure if adopted would raise the
problems of setting governmental machinery, into action during
each. emergency, and of actual operation of seized plants. The
third alternative and the one most favorable to the states, would
be amendment of the National Labor Relations Act specifically
authorizing the states to regulate industrial disputes which create
local emergencies as the states were given power to regulate
1951]
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union security agreements. The chief obstacle to amendment
would be the hesitancy of Congress to let the states decide in each
case what constitutes an emergency.
One certain conclusion to be drawn from the Motor Coach
Employees decision is that the states must re-examine their labor
relations policies with a view toward adoption of one which will
do most toward making voluntary collective bargaining work-
able and keeping labor-management disputes at a minimum.
Thomas J. Poche
LEVEE CONSTRUCTION-FEDERAL EXPROPRIATION
OF RIPARIAN LAND
The plaintiff's trees, which he owned separate and apart from
the land they were situated on, were destroyed by a subcontractor
repairing a levee for the federal government. The plaintiff is
seeking damages under the Tucker Act,' alleging that by destroy-
ing the trees the government impliedly contracted to reimburse
the owner for them. The decision herein was rendered on a
motion to dismiss on the grounds that the petition did not state a
cause of action. The defendant attempted to avail itself of the
Louisiana constitutional provision that there can be no recovery
from the state unless the property was assessed for taxes the
preceding year by the state and its subdivisions. 2 The court dis-
posed of the motion in favor of the -plaintiff by relying on Tilden
v. United States3 and held that the case should be tried on its
merits. General Box Company v. United States, 94 F. Supp. 441
(D.C. La. 1951).
The Tilden case, decided by this same district court, was also
to recover the value of property destroyed by the federal govern-
ment in the process of building a levee. There the court held that
the Flood Control Act,4 providing for the building of levees, "spe-
cifically provided for payment"' and the plaintiff could recover
in spite of the fact that the property had not been assessed as
required by the Louisiana Constitution of 1921 which provides
1. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(a) (1950). "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction, concurrent with the Court of Claims, of: ... (2) Any other civil
action or claim against the United States, not exceeding $10,000 in amount,
founded ... upon any express or implied contract with the United States ...."
2. La. Const. of 1921, Art. XVI, § 6. "Lands and improvements thereon
hereafter actually used or destroyed for levees or levee drainage purposes,
.. shall be paid for at a price not to exceed the assessed value for the preced-
ing year; provided, that this shall not apply to batture. ..
3. 10 F. Supp. 377 (D.C. La. 1934).
4. 33 U.S.C.A. § 594 (1928).
5. 10 F. Supp. 377, 379 (D.C. La. 1934).
[VOL.. XI
